WebWe find that greater motivated monitoring institutional ownership is associated with a higher marginal value of corporate cash holdings, which cannot be explained by other corporate governance measures and institution types. Web18 feb. 2024 · Other institutions will not monitor. Using acquisition decisions to reveal monitoring, we show that only concentrated holdings by independent long-term institutions are related to post-merger ...
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Web1 jun. 2024 · Because multiple blockholding allows institutions to accumulate governance-relevant information and develop monitoring expertise through their prior experience, it … Web20 mei 2024 · The academic governance literature proposes two main channels through which large institutional investors can affect corporate governance decisions: Voice and exit (the “Wall Street walk”). Both channels, however, appear ill … elecom jc-u4113s 動かない
Institutional investor monitoring motivation and the margina
Web18 nov. 2024 · We refer to institutions pertaining to the former aspects as institutions providing vertical constraints on the incumbent, and the latter as institutions providing horizontal constraints. 2 Existing research is often unclear on which institutional cluster is more important for conflict risk. Web17 mei 2009 · I study the role of institutional investors to play in the relative informational efficiency of transaction prices, measured by departures from a random walk, using a sample of the constituent stocks of the Shanghai 180 composite index from 2004 to 2005. I find that greater informational efficiency is associated with larger institutional holdings. WebWe examine the impact of institutional investors on the effectiveness of firms' governance in Korea, as evidenced by information asymmetry. We find that lagged institutional blockholdings are negatively related to future information asymmetry measures, primarily through long-term, domestic institutions. elecom km-a22bbk マニュアル